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Although the rights ofpublic employees to organize and bargain
collectively have increased slgnjicantly in many states, the southeastern
states have been reluctant to join this expansion. In this Article, Dean
Beaird surveys thepublic sector laborpolicies of the southeastern states
and then examines the prospects for federal regulation ofpublic em-
ployee labor relations. The driveforfederal regulation of this area of
labor law received a severe setback in National League of Cities v.
Usery. After carefully examining this important decision and its back-
ground, Dean Beaird concludes that Congress lacks the authority under
either the commerce clause, the spending power, or the fourteenth
amendment to enact comprehensive legislation governing public sector
labor relations. Therefore, the onus is upon the states to enact this
needed legislation.
I. INTRODUCTION
As recently as a decade ago, a well-known authority in the field of public
employee labor relations stated that "[i]f state and local governments don't act
quickly to provide the machinery for the resolution of employer-employee re-
lation disputes in their locality, the Federal Government will do so." 1 In Na-
tional League of Cities v. Usery,2 however, the Supreme Court seems to have
dealt a severe blow to the cause of federal uniformity in this area by reserving
to the states the right to determine policy and maintain control over certain
employment conditions for those employees engaged in essential government
functions.3 State legislation governing the labor relations of state and local
government employees prior to National League was inconsistent at best, and
states have not responded substantially to the growing need for development
of labor policies governing these groups. The time has come for states to exer-
t Dean and Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. A.B., LL.B., Univer-
sity of Alabama, 1949, 195 1; LL.M., George Washington University, 1953. These comments are
part of a collaborative effort between the author and Professor Nicholas Beadles of the University
of Georgia School of Business Administration. The author wishes to express his appreciation to
Rob Goldsmith, Cliff Johnson, and Jesse Stone for their very substantial assistance in the prepara-
tion of this Article.
I. Anderson, Overview of Collective Bargainin the Public Sector, in NAT'L INST. OF MUN.
L. OFFICERS, REP. No. 153, LABOR UNIONS AND MUNICIPALmES 47, 50 (1968).
2. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
3. Id. at 852. See Wel & Manas, Can a Federal Collective Bargaining Statute for Public
Employees Meet the Requirements of National League of Cities v. Usery?: A Management Perspec-
tive, 6 J.L. & EDUC. 515, 526 (1977).
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cise their authority to establish much-needed policies for state and local gov-
ernment employee labor relations.
This Article will review the prospects for federal or state regulation of
employer-employee relations at the state and local government level. After
briefly examining the legal status of state and municipal employee labor rela-
tions, I will trace the development, or lack thereof, of laws governing these
employee groups in the Southeast. I then will explore the historical underpin-
ning of National League of Cities v. Usery in an effort to understand the ex-
traordinary character of the Supreme Court's decision that Congress lacks
authority under the commerce clause to regulate wages and hours of state em-
ployees.4 Next, examination of the aftermath of National League will indicate
that prospects for federal regulation of collective bargaining for these groups
under either the commerce clause, the spending power, or the fourteenth
amendment are bleak.
II. THE STATUS OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEE LABOR RELATIONS LAW
Over 14 million Americans now are employed by federal, state, and local
governments, 5 and in recent years these public employees have sought to join
unions and employee associations in increasing numbers. Nevertheless, when
Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act in 1935,6 the rights of
employees to organize and bargain collectively were guaranteed only to em-
ployees in the private sector;7 the Act specifically exempted both federal and
state government employees. 8 Furthermore, beginning with the Ninety-First
Congress and continuing in each succeeding session, numerous bills have been
introduced to establish federal jurisdiction over state and local public em-
ployee labor-management relations.9 None, however, has yet passed.' 0 Al-
though there have been some efforts to expand federal authority over state and
local labor relations through Congressional withdrawal of certain longstand-
ing exemptions from regulation-for example, the 1966"1 and 197412 inclu-
sions of state and local governments under the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938, the 197013 and 197614 inclusions under the unemployment compensation
4. See Weil & Manas, supra note 3, at 519.
5. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, SUMMARY OF PUBLIC SECTOR LABOR RELATIONS POLICIES V
(1976).
6. National Labor Relations Act of 1935, ch. 372,49 Stat. 449 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-
169 (1976)).
7. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1976). See Comment, The Right fPublic Employees to Unionize, 40
Miss. LJ. 415 (1969).
8. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1976).
9. See Well & Manas, supra note 3, at 516.
10. Id.
11. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, § 102(b), 80 Stat. 830
(codified at 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1976)).
12. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 6(a)(1), 88 Stat. 55
(codified at 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1976)).
13. Employment Security Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-373, § 104(b)(1), 84 Stat. 695
(codified at 26 U.S.C. § 3309(a)(2) (1976)).
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provisions'- of the Social Security Act of 1935,16 and the 1972 inclusion17
under the equal employment guarantees of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 8 -such expansion apparently has been slowed by the Supreme Court's
ruling in National League of Cities v. Usery.'19
III. DEVELOPMENT OF PUBLIC SECTOR LABOR RELATIONS
IN THE SOUTHEAST
Like federal legislation, most state statutes guaranteeing the right to or-
ganize and bargain collectively have not been applied to public employees.
20
The first affirmative legislative approach to public employee labor relations
did not appear until 1959 when Wisconsin enacted the landmark Municipal
Employment Relations Act.2 1 Although each state has the authority to estab-
lish its own policy and structure for labor relations, only twenty-three states
and the District of Columbia have enacted comprehensive statutes concerning
all public employees.22 The legislative response to the growing incidence of
public sector organization and collective bargaining in the Southeast has been
noticeably deficient. Only Florida has enacted a comprehensive provision
covering all public employees. 23 While only North Carolina24 and Virginia2 5
expressly have denied bargaining rights to public employees, 26 most southeast-
ern states have been reluctant to enact more than limited legislation. What
follows is a detailed, state-by-state analysis of the status of "public labor" pol-
icy in the Southeast, framed in the context of the rights of public employees to
organize, collectively bargain, and strike.27
Alabama's right to work law has not been applied to state and local em-
14. Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-566, § 115(b)(1), 90
Stat. 2667 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 3309(b)(3) (1976)).
15. 26 U.S.C. § 3309 (1976).
16. Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (codified in scattered sections of 26, 42 U.S.C. and other
titles in U.S.C.).
17. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2(2), 86 Stat. 103
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (1976)).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976).
19. See Rhyne, Federal Powers ofegulation, 30 LABOR L.J. 571 (1979). The expansion of
federal regulation of state and local public employee labor relations was not limited to the elimi-
nation of earlier established exemptions. In an evolving line of cases the courts have recognized a
constitutional right of state and local employees to organize. See American Fed'n of State,
County and Mun. Employees v. Woodward, 406 F.2d 137 (8th Cir. 1969); McLaughlin v. Tilendis,
398 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1969); Atkins v. City of Charlotte, 296 F. Supp. 1068 (W.D.N.C. 1969).
20. Beaird, Labor Relations Policyfor Public Employees: A Legal Perspective, 4 GA. L. REv.
110, 116 (1969).
21. Municipal Employment Relations Act, ch. 509, 1959 Wis. Laws 623 (codified as amended
at Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.70 (Supp. 1969)).
22. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, SUMMARY OF PUBLIC SECTOR LABOR RELATIONS POLICIES V
(1979) [hereinafter cited as U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR SUMMARY.
23. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 447:201 -:607 (West 1977 & Cum. Supp. 1979).
24. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-97 (1975).
25. Teamsters Local 822 v. City of Portsmouth, 423 F. Supp. 954 (E.D. Va. 1975), af'd, 534
F.2d 328 (4th Cir. 1976).
26. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR SUMMARY, supra note 22, at 65.
27. See Beaird, supra note 20, at 117.
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ployees.28 Like most southeastern states, Alabama has limited its public labor
legislation to two categories of employees, firefighters and teachers, and both
groups expressly are permitted to join or refrain from joining unions. 29 Al-
though firefighters are empowered to present proposals,30 teachers have been
granted only consultation rights.31 Similarly, the firefighters' scope of bargain-
ing encompasses salaries and other conditions of employment, 32 while that of
teachers extends only to rules and regulations concerning the conduct and
management of the schools. 33 Strikes by public employees are illegal, and
public employees cannot bargain with unions without the express constitu-
tional or statutory authority to do so.
34
Florida is the sole southeastern state to enact comprehensive legislation
covering all public employees. 35 Florida's right to work law has been applied
to all public employees, 36 and all members of the public sector have the right
to form or join any employee organization of their choice.37 There is a statu-
tory duty to bargain in Florida.38 Public employees have the right to negotiate
collectively through a certified bargaining agent with their employer in the
determination of the terms and conditions of their employment. 39 They also
have the right to be represented in any adjudication of grievances.40 Once
certified, bargaining agents are permitted to bargain collectively in the deter-
mination of wages and hours within the bargaining Unit.41 Like Alabama,
Florida expressly prohibits strikes,42 and extensive penalties may result from
work stoppage.
43
Georgia's right to work law specifically excludes the state and its political
subdivisions from coverage.44 Georgia has limited its public labor legislation
to a single group-firefighters.45 These individuals are granted the right to
meet and confer concerning determinations of wages, rates of pay, hours,
working conditions, and all other terms and conditions of employment. 46 A
28. ALA. CODE § 27-7-34 (1975). For an in-depth examination of right to work laws in the
South, see this symposium, Haggard, Right to Work Laws in the Southern States.
29. ALA. CODE §§ 11-43-143(b), 16-8-10, 16-11-18 (1975).
30. Id. § 11-43-143(b).
31. Id. §§ 16-8-10, -11-18.
32. Id. § 11-43-143(b).
33. Id. §§ 16-8-10, -11-18.
34. United Steelworkers v. University of Ala., 430 F. Supp. 996 (N.D. Ala. 1977), afl'd, 599
F.2d 56 (5th Cir. 1979); Operating Engineers Local 321 v. Water Works Bd., 276 Ala. 462, 163 So.
2d 619 (1964).
35. Act of May 30, 1974, ch. 74-100, 1974 Fla. Laws 134 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 447.201 -.607. (West. 1977 & Cum. Supp. 1979)).
36. FLA. CONsT. art. 1, § 6.
37. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 447.301(1) (West 1977).
38. Id. § 447.301(2).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. § 447.309(1).
42. Id. § 447.505.
43. Id. § 447.507.
44. GA. CODE ANN. § 54-90 (1974).
45. Id. § 54-1304.
46. Id.
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governmental body cannot enter into a binding contract with a union, and,
therefore, collective bargaining contracts between, for example, school boards
and unions are void as illegal delegations of policy.47 In Georgia, state em-
ployees are prohibited from promoting, encouraging, or participating in
strikes; 48 furthermore, the Georgia judiciary will enforce the mandatory strike
penalties of loss of employment plus forfeiture of civil status, job rights, and
seniority.
4 9
While Kentucky has no statute of general application dealing with public
sector labor relations, the state has promulgated a comprehensive set of labor
laws for firefighters50 and police officers. 51 Strangely, although the courts of
Kentucky uniformly have held that there is neither a statutory nor a common-
law right of public employees to engage in concerted work activities for collec-
tive bargaining purposes, the principle of public employee collective bargain-
ing has been upheld.5 2 Firefighters and police officers thus have been granted
the right to organize and join unions, and their scope of bargaining rights en-
compasses wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment.5 3 In Ken-
tucky no public employee has the right to strike or engage in other concerted
work activities against a public employer.
54
Although Louisiana's right to work law55 does apply to state and local
government employees, the state does not have a collective bargaining statute
for public employees.5 6 Police officers, firefighters, and teachers can join un-
ions and engage in collective bargaining with their employers.57 Nevertheless,
Louisiana law does not require collective bargaining with municipal employee
unions,58 and the recognition of unions by state agencies is a policy determina-
tion made administratively.59 Public employees have no statutory right to en-
gage in concerted actions involving refusal to work or other strike-related
activities. 6
0
Mississippi has no relevant legislation pertaining to employment in the
public sector.61 The state has no collective bargaining statute for public em-
47. Chatham Ass'n of Educators v. Board of Pub. Educ., 231 Ga. 806, 204 S.E.2d 138 (1974).
48. GA. CODE ANN. § 89-1301 (1980). See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR SUMMARY, supra note 22,
at 31.
49. See GA. CODE ANN. § 89-1303 (1980) (strike penalties listed).
50. Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 345.010-130 (1977).
51. Id. §§ 78.470-480 (Supp. 1978).
52. Zielke, Public Sector Labor Law in Kentucky, 6 N. KY. L. REV. 327, 334 (1979).
53. Ky. REv. STAT. § 345.030(1) (1977) (firefighters); id. § 78.470-.480 (Supp. 1978) (police).
54. Zielke, supra note 52, at 347. See Jefferson County Teachers Ass'n v. Jefferson County
Bd. of Educ., 463 S.W.2d 627 (Ky. 1970).
55. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23:981-987 (West Cum. Supp. 1980).
56. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR SUMMARY, supra note 22, at 21.
57. Id.
58. Beauboeufv. Delgado College, 303 F. Supp. 861 (E.D. La. 1969), aj'd, 428 F.2d 470 (5th
Cir. 1970).
59. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR SUMMARY, supra note 22, at 21.
60. Id. at 20.
61. Id. at 30.
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ployees.62 The state's right to work law, however, is applicable to all employ-
ees other than those under the jurisdiction of the Federal Railway Labor
Act.63
North Carolina represents the nadir of state legislation implementing
public sector organization and collective bargaining.64 Originally, the public
sector was statutorily denied the right to organize, as public employees were
prohibited from becoming members of any union that had as its purpose "col-
lective bargaining. with respect to grievances, labor disputes, wages or sal-
ary, rates of pay, hours of employment, or the conditions of work. ' 6-5 In 1969
this statute was declared unconstitutional. 66 Nevertheless, bargaining rights
still are prohibited, and all contracts pursuant to bargaining agreements are
illegal and void as against public policy.67 Striking public employees are not
protected under the laws of the state.
68
South Carolina's right to work law arguably could apply to state and local
employees.69 An opinion of the South Carolina Attorney General suggests,
however, that the right to work law was not intended to apply to public em-
ployees. 70 The state has no collective bargaining statute for public employ-
ees.7 1 Although South Carolina grants public employees no statutory rights to
organize or bargain, there are two statutes that deal with grievance procedures
for state72 and local73 employment. South Carolina public employees are, as
is the norm in the Southeast, prohibited from striking.
74
Virginia, like North Carolina, denies public employees any bargaining
rights. 75 Thus, Virginia has not enacted a collective bargaining statute for
public employees,76 and local governments are precluded from negotiating or
entering into binding contracts with public employee organizations. 77 Like
South Carolina, Virginia does have several statutes dealing with grievance
procedures for state78 and local79 employees. Strikes are prohibited, and strik-
62. Id.
63. Miss Const., art. 8, § 198-A.
64. For an in-depth examination of the rights of public employees in North Carolina, see this
symposium, Comment, Labor Law.- Public Sector Employees and Unions in North Carolina.
65. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-97 (1975).
66. Atkins v. City of Charlotte, 296 F. Supp. 1068 (W.D.N.C. 1969).
67. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-98 (1975).
68. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR SUMMARY, supra note 22, at 49.
69. S.C. CODE § 41-7-10 (1976).
70. 1963-64 Op. Att'y Gen. 298 (1964).
71. U.S. DEPT OF LABOR SUMMARY, supra note 22, at 49.
72. S.C. CODE §§ 8-17-10 to -17-40 (1976).
73. Id. §§ 8-17-110 to -17-160.
74. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR SUMMARY, supra note 22, at 49.
75. Id. at 65. See Teamsters Local 822 v. City of Portsmouth, 423 F. Supp. 954 (E.D. Va.
1975), aft'd, 534 F.2d 328 (4th Cir. 1976). (Virginia legislature does not recognize union represen-
tation of public employees).
76. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR SUMMARY, supra note 22, at 56.
77. Commonwealth v. County Bd., 217 Va. 558, 232 S.E.2d 30 (1977).
78. VA. CODE § 2.1-114.5:1 (1979). See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR SUMMARY, supra note 22, at
56.
79. VA. CODE § 15.1-7.2 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
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ing public employees forfeit their employment and eligibility for public em-
ployment for one year.
80
The southeastern states clearly have made little effort to respond to the
growing incidence of public sector organization and collective bargaining.
Significantly, of the three states specifically prohibiting bargaining rights in
the public sector, two are in the Southeast;8 ' similarly, three of the eleven
states providing no public sector labor legislation are in this area.82 Public
employees clearly have no right to strike in the Southeast, and many states in
the region impose harsh penalties for work stoppage. Of the twenty-three
states enacting comprehensive statutes covering all public employees, only
one, Florida, is in the Southeast.
83
IV. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF NATIONAL LEAGUE
As the preceding survey indicates, the development of state labor rela-
tions policies for public sector employees has been a halting and irregular pro-
cess. Public policy, particularly in the southeastern states, reflects indifference
or outright hostility towards the collective efforts of public workers. The mini-
mal existing regulation usually affects narrow segments of the total work force.
Dissatisfied with the state response to their problems, labor leaders during the
early 1970's began to call for comprehensive schemes of federal regulation.
The details of their proposals ranged from the suggested elimination of the
National Labor Relations Act's state and municipal employer exclusion 84 to
comprehensive recommendations for new agencies dealing exclusively with
public sector labor relations.85
Underlying most of these proposals was the assimption that Congress'
power to regulate interstate commerce would provide ample constitutional
support for their enactment. Forty years of commerce clause precedent pre-
cipitated by the Fair Labor Standards Act8 6 virtually assured the constitu-
tional success of the proposed legislation. Proponents of this legislation were
startled in 1976 when the Supreme Court's decision in NationalLeague of Cit-
ies v. Usery87 upset their most basic assumptions. Assessing the prospects for
the proposals in the new decade88 requires careful examination of the com-
80. Id. § 40.1-55 (1976).
81. Id. at 65. The two southeastern states are North Carolina and Virginia. Id See text
accompanying notes 64-68, 75-80 supra. The third state is Texas. See TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN.
art. 5154c (Vernon 1971). Texas, however, does give the right to bargain collectively to firefighters
and police officers. Id. art. 5154c-I (Vernon Supp. 1979).
82. These states are Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR SUM-
MARY, supra note 22, at 65.
83. Id.
84. H.R. 777, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
85.' H.R. 1987, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
86. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 -219 (1976).
87. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
88. The author wishes to acknowledge the use in preparing the following portion of this
article of his previous publication on this subject: Beaird & Ellington, ACommerce Seesaw: Bal-
ancing National League of Cities, 11 GA. L. REv. 35 (1976).
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merce clause precedent on which they had relied and of the decision in Na-
tional League.
As an express exercise of its power to regulate interstate commerce, Con-
gress enacted the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) in 1938.89 The Act estab-
lished minimum wage9° and maximum hour 9' provisions for employees
directly engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, but
specifically excluded from its coverage employees of states and their political
subdivisions.92 The wage and hour provisions were premised on a congres-
sional finding that maintenance of substandard labor conditions burdened the
free flow of goods and led to labor disputes that obstructed commerce. 93
In 1941 the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the FLSA in
United States v. Darby.94 Dismissing arguments that the power to regulate
wages was a police power reserved to the states by the tenth amendment, the
Court decided that Congress could regulate the local production of goods even
to the extent of establishing minimum labor standards as an appropriate
means of regulating commerce itself.95 No barrier to commerce clause regula-
tion inhered in the tenth amendment, which was "but a truism. . . declara-
tory of the relationship between the national and state governments. '96
Two amendments to the FLSA invoked the second major challenge to the
constitutionality of the Act. In 1961 FLSA coverage was expanded to include
all employees of an "enterprise" that has any employees engaged in com-
merce. 97 In 1966 Congress removed certain employees of public schools, hos-
pitals, and other institutions from the original public employer exemption and
thus extended the Act's benefits to 3.5 million nonsupervisory government em-
ployees.98 Following the 1966 amendments, a state claiming the power to con-
trol its own employees could invoke the tenth amendment more powerfully
than it had in Darby when the state's interest was limited to regulation of local
private business.
When Maryland tried to enjoin the Secretary of Labor from enforcing
these amendments against state-operated schools and hospitals in 1968, the
Court upheld both amendments in Maryland v. Wirtz.99 Rather than attack-
ing factually the classification of schools and hospitals as "enterprises" in com-
merce or challenging the alleged effect on commerce of the labor conditions of
89. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976)).
90. Id, § 6 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1976)).
91. Id. § 7 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 207 (1976)).
92. Id. § 203(d) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1976)).
93. Id. § 2(a) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 202(a) (1976)).
94. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
95. Id. at 121.
96. Id. at 124.
97. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-30, 75 Stat. 65 (1961) (codi-
fied at 29 U.S.C. § 203(s) (1976)).
98. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, 80 Stat. 830 (1966)
(codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(d), (r) (1), (s) (4) (1976)).
99. 392 U.S. 183 (1968), overruled, National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 855
(1976).
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such institutions, the Wirtz plaintiffs attacked the 1966 amendments directly as
an unconstitutional exercise of the commerce power over a state governmental
entity.'00 The Court did not analogize the commerce power to the taxing
power, from which a state immunity already had been developed and upheld
for uniquely state operations.' 0 1 Instead, the Court relied on United States v.
Calfornia,10 2 a 1936 case in which it upheld congressional exercise of the
commerce power in the Federal Safety Appliance Act' 03 to cover California's
state owned and operated railroad.'0 4 The Wirtz Court quoted from United
States v. California:
[W]e think it unimportant to say whether the state conducts its
railroad in its "sovereign" or in its "private" capacity. That in oper-
ating its railroad it is acting within a power reserved to the states
cannot be doubted. The only question we need consider is whether
the exercise of that power, in whatever capacity, must be in subordi-
nation to the power to regulate interstate commerce, which has been
granted specifically to the national government. The sovereign
power of the states is necessarily diminished to the extent of the
grants of power to the federal government in the Constitution.
[W]e look to the activities in which the states have traditionally
engaged as marking the boundary of the restriction upon the federal
taxing power. But there is no such limitation upon the plenary power
to regulate commerce. The state can no more deny the power if its
exercise has been authorized by Congress than can an individual.'
0 5
In restating the Calfornia rule in Wirtz, the Court declared that "the Fed-
eral Government, when acting within a delegated power, may override coun-
tervailing state interests whether these be described as 'governmental' or
'proprietary' in character."' 106 The Court even implied that there was no room
for a balancing of interests, claiming that the Court had already "put to rest
the contention that state concerns might constitutionally 'outweigh' the impor-
tance of an otherwise valid federal statute regulating commerce."'
10 7
Justice Douglas voiced a prophetic dissent in Wirtz. He argued that some
distinction between the activities of a state in its sovereign and nonsovereign
capacity should control the constitutionality of commerce clause regulation. 08
Using terms later adopted in the National League majority opinion, 10 9 he in-
sisted that the tenth amendment must raise some barriers to the commerce
100. Id. at 195.
101. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946); Helvering v. Gerhart, 304 U.S.
405 (1938).
102. 297 U.S. 175 (1936).
103. 45 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1976).
104. 297 U.S. at 182-83.
105. 392 U.S. at 197-98, (quoting United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 183-85 (1936))
(citations omitted).
106. 392 U.S. at 195.
107. Id. at 195-96.
108. Id. at 203-04 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
109. See 426 U.S. at 855.
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power, for otherwise the national government "could devour the essentials of
state sovereignty."' 10
Seven years later, in Fry v. United States,"'1 Ohio state employees chal-
lenged congressional authority to mandate in the Economic Stabilization
Act 12 a wage and salary freeze pursuant to the commerce power. 13 In re-
jecting arguments that the Act's regulation of state and local government wage
levels interfered with sovereign state functions in violation of the tenth amend-
ment, the Supreme Court in Fry reiterated the Wirtz conclusion that there was
no intergovernmental immunity from commerce power regulation. 14 In
terms less ambitious than those used in Wirtz, the majority in Fry recognized
that tenth amendment considerations were to be respected, but held that the
wage restrictions did not amount to the "drastic invasion of state sovereignty"
that the tenth amendment was designed to prohibit.' 15 Through this state-
ment it is possible that Justice Marshall, writing for the Fry majority, was
attempting to move the constitutional discussion from one of unlimited con-
gressional freedom to exercise the commerce power (as articulated in Wirtz) to
one of a factual determination whether the federal intrusion into state affairs
was too substantial.
Justice Rehnquist issued a strong dissent in Fry, arguing that a state
might assert the tenth amendment in affrmative defense of its sovereignty
when confronted by an exercise of the regulatory power delegated to Congress
by the commerce clause. 116 Relying on intergovernmental tax immunity
cases,11 7 Justice Rehnquist proposed a test that permitted congressional regu-
lation of state activity so long as it was "unlike the traditional governmental
activities of a state,"'1 18 but which prohibited interference with traditional state
functions. His proposal for a case-by-case analysis balancing state interests
against federal commerce power objectives 19 would in a year's time become
substantially the majority opinion in National League.
New amendments to the FLSA in 1974 established revised minimum
wage provisions for state and local government employees and extended the
Act's coverage to include eleven million workers in nearly all areas of state
government.' 20 Less than twenty-four hours before the amendments were to
become fully effective, the National League of Cities and others unsuccessfully
110. 392 U.S. at 205 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
111. 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
112. 12 U.S.C. § 1904 (1976).
113. 421 U.S. at 545.
114. Id. at 548.
115. Id. at 547-48 n.7.
116. Id. at 553 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
117. As authority for state immunity from federal taxation Justice Rehnquist cited, among
others, United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936). 421 U.S. at 553 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
118. 421 U.S. at 558 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
119. Id.
120. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, 88 Stat. 55 (codified at
29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976).
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sought to enjoin their enforcement before a three-judge district court.12 ' Later
the same day, Chief Justice Burger, sitting as a circuit justice, granted the re-
quested injunction pending review by the full Court of the "novel" legal ques-
tions raised by the petition.
122
Justice Rehnquist then carefully set to work to overturn Maryland v.
Wirtz and establish the tenth amendment as an atfirmative constitutional limi-
tation on Congress' use of the commerce power to regulate a state in the exer-
cise of its traditional functions. His conviction was that the plenary power of
Congress could not be used to destroy the ability of the states to survive as
states. Speaking for a five-man majority in National League of Cities v.
Usery,123 he adopted as a broad statement of principle the protection of
"functions essential to separate and independent existence" of a state.
124
These functions were those "undoubted attribute[s] of state sovereignty,"' 
25
the "congressionally imposed displacement [of which] may substantially
restructure traditional ways in which the local governments have arranged
their affairs."' 126 Noting anticipated increases in state costs, curtailment of
state services, and displacement of certain state policy choices that would re-
sult from the 1974 FLSA amendments,' 27 he concluded that "both the mini-
mum wage and the maximum hours provisions [of the Act] will impermissibly
interfere with the integral governmental functions of these bodies."' 28 The
opinion denied that the degree of interference involved was crucial, and sug-
gested instead that a threshold test of federal intrustion within areas of tradi-
tional state functions would apply.129 Justice Rehnquist expressly rejected as
"simply wrong" the United States v. Calfornia dictum disclaiming limits on
the commerce power,' 3 0 and he overruled Wirtz in its allowance of FLSA
coverage of public schools and hospitals.'
3'
In its renewed recognition that structural federalism constrains congres-
sional action, National League is unquestionably a decision of considerable
significance. Faced with new claims of the right of states to protect their sov-
ereignty against federal intrusion, the Court elevated the tenth amendment
from the status of a mere "truism"1 32 to a position of dominance protecting
the states as "corrdinate element[s]" in the federal system.
133
121. National League of Cities v. Brennan, 406 F.Supp. 826 (D.D.C. 1974).
122. National League of Cities v. Brennan, No. A-553 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 31, 1974).
123. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). Justice Rehnquist was joined in the majority opinion by Chief Jus-
tice Burger and Justices Stewart, Blackman, and Powell.
124. Id. at 845, quoting Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559, 580 (1911).
125. 426 U.S. at 845.
126. Id. at 849.
127. Id. at 846-48.
128. Id. at 851.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 854-55.
131. Id. at 855.
132. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. at 124.
133. 426 U.S. at 849.
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V. AFTERMATH OF NATIONAL LEAGUE
Notwithstanding the significant contributions of constitutional analysis
made by Justice Rehnquist in National League, his decision immediately
raised grave doubts about the viability of various proposals for federal regula-
tion of state and local government employee labor relations. What are the
prospects for such legislation after National League?
A. The Commerce Clause
Generalizations about the future impact of National League are safest in
discussions of proposals predicated on the commerce clause as this was the
source of congressional power underlying the objectionable 1974 FLSA
amendments. Most proponents of federal regulation of state and local govern-
ment employee labor relations had assumed, especially in light of the broad
pronouncements in Wirtz, that the commerce power would amply support
their new schemes. Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in National League,
however, specifically recognized as "[o]ne undoubted attribute of state sover-
eignty ... the States' power to determine the wages which shall be paid to
those whom they employ in order to carry out their governmental functions,
what hours those persons will work, and what compensation will be provided
where these employees may be called upon to work overtime." 134 Moreover,
in rejecting the United States v. California dictum that state sovereignty im-
posed no limits on the congressional commerce power, he flatly declared that
"Congress may not exercise that power so as to force directly upon the States
its choices as to how essential decisions regarding the conduct of integral gov-
ernmental functions are to be made."'
135
It is difficult to conceive how Congress could draft consistent with these
limits on commerce clause regulation. Proponents of such legislation argue
that it merely would establish a procedural framework leaving substantive de-
tails of employment decisions to the states. 136 The protections for state sover-
eignty articulated in National League appear to extend beyond substantive
decision making, however, to include "choices as to how essential decisions
regarding the conduct of integral governmental functions are to be made."'
137
Moreover, to the extent that federal regulation may impose a duty on state and
local government employers to bargain with their employees (a duty that
seems essential to an effective regulatory scheme), the "States' abilities to
structure employer-employee relationships"' 138 certainly would be "signifi-
cantly alter[ed]."' 139 Finally, although increased costs resulting from imple-
mentation of the 1974 FLSA amendments were not "crucial" in the Court's
134. Id. at 845.
135. Id. at 855 (emphasis added).
136. See Shaller, The Constitutionality of a Federal Collective Bargaining Statutefor Slate and
Local Employees, 8 CAP. U. L. REV. 59 (1978).
137. 426 U.S. at 855 (emphasis added).
138. Id. at 851.
139. Id.
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analysis in National League, 140 the increase in wage levels that predictably
may follow implementation of a federal regulatory scheme certainly would
influence the Court in assessing the intrusive nature of such labor legislation.
In short, prospects for federal regulation of state and local government em-
ployee labor relations predicated on Congress' commerce power are unpromis-
ing.
B. The Spending Power
National League did not reach the question "whether different results
might be obtained if Congress seeks to affect integral operations of state gov-
ernment by exercising authority granted it under" the spending power. 14 The
Supreme Court traditionally has made a very expansive reading of the spend-
ing power. "[Tihe power of Congress to authorize expenditure of public mon-
eys for public purposes is not limited by the direct grants of legislative power
found in the Constitution."' 42 Thus, it might be argued that Congress could
initiate a federal public employee relations act as a condition of federal assist-
ance. 14
3
Nevertheless, it has been suggested that any federal collective bargaining
provision Congress might enact pursuant to its spending power should be pro-
hibited constitutionally. 144 Although the Supreme Court limited its decision
in National League to the commerce clause, many of the cases Justice Rehn-
quist cited in establishing the Court's concept of federalism did not involve the
commerce clause.145 To prevent an usurpation of the states' traditional sover-
eign powers, the tenth amendment now operates as a restraint on all constitu-
tional powers exercised by the federal government. 14 6 A federal collective
bargaining statute, enacted as a precondition to federal funding, thus would
amount to an unconstitutional federal interference with an essential element of
state sovereignty--the power to determine wages and hours of employees. 1
47
C. The Fourteenth Amendment
It also might be contended that Congress could implement public em-
ployee labor legislation pursuant to section five of the fourteenth amendment.
Because Congress is empowered under that provision to enforce the fourteenth
amendment's equal protection and due process guarantees,148 one might con-
140. Id.
141. Id. at 852 n.17.
142. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66 (1936). See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 90 (1976)
(Court reaffirmed broad reading of the spending power).
143. See Shaller, supra note 136, at 69.
144. See Noble & Kilroy, The Constitutionality of a National Public Employee Relations Act: A
Case for States' Rights, 13 VAL. U. L. REv. 1, 23 (1978).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 25.
148. Section 5 of the fourteenth amendment states that "[t]he Congress shall have power to
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 5.
See Noble & Kilroy, supra note 144, at 25.
1980]
NORTH CAROLIN4 LAW REVIEW[
dude reasonably that a federal statute protecting the rights of public employ-
ees to organize and select collective bargaining representatives would
withstand judicial scrutiny. 14 9 The majority in National League did not con-
sider what would have been the result had Congress passed the 1974 Amend-
ments pursuant to the fourteenth amendment. 150 Recent Supreme Court
decisions, however, indicate that the power granted Congress under that
amendment is not broad enough to permit such action.151 For example, in
Oregon v. Mitchell'52 the majority clearly evidenced their belief that the states'
exercise of their traditional sovereign power should be protected from federal
interference premised on the fourteenth amendment: "[I]t cannot be success-
fully argued that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to strip the states
of their power, carefully preserved in the original Constitution, to govern
themselves." 1
5 3
In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,154 however, Justice Rehnquist did find broader
Congressional power to act under section five of the fourteenth amendment
than under any of the Article I powers. In Fitzpatrick the Court upheld, under
the aegis of the fourteenth amendment, the 1972 congressional extension of
Title VII coverage to state employees, stating:
When Congress acts pursuant to § 5, not only is it exercising
legislative authority that is plenary within the terms of the constitu-
tional grant, it is exercising that authority under one section of a con-
stitutional Amendment whose other sections by their own terms
embody limitations on state authority. We think that Congress
may. . .provide for private suits against States or state officials which
are constitutionally impermissible in other contexts.1 55
Nevertheless, the balancing approach applied in National League, which
protects state sovereignty by-weighing the state's claim to independence in de-
cision making against the federal policy interests sought to be furthered, ar-
guably would preclude Congress from using the fourteenth amendment to
invade the immunity protected by the eleventh amendment, unless individual
rights otherwise could not be protected. Thus, because of the judicially en-
forced doctrine of federalism advocated in National League, Congress lacks
power under section five of the fourteenth amendment to enact a federal col-
lective bargaining statute.'
56
149. See Shaller, supra note 136, at 76.
150. 426 U.S. at 852 n.17.
151. See Noble & Kilroy, supra note 144, at 26.
152. 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
153. Id. at 127.
154. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
155. Id. at 456.
156. See Noble & Kilroy, supra note 144, at 30.
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